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TAKING WHAT THEY GIVE US: EXPLAINING
THE COURT’S FEDERALISM OFFENSIVE
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON†
INTRODUCTION
For several years now, the Supreme Court has disquieted ob-
servers and commentators by reasserting the presence of constitu-
tional limitations on national power resulting from the federal struc-
ture of the American political system. Although not quite amounting
to a revolution in American constitutional law, the recent federalism
cases are nonetheless striking.1 They are, of course, most remarkable
because they reverse over fifty years of nearly uninterrupted defer-
ence to the national government in matters relating to federalism and
the structural limits on the powers of the central government. With
the exception of an ill-fated attempt to identify such limits in 1976,
under the guidance of then–Associate Justice William Rehnquist,2 the
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1. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607–27 (2000) (holding that Congress
lacks the authority to provide civil remedies for gender-motivated violence); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80–91 (2000) (holding that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate state
immunity against disability discrimination lawsuits); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999)
(holding that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity from lawsuits in
state courts).
2. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.) (holding
that Congress lacks the authority to interfere with traditional state governmental functions).
The decision in National League of Cities was overturned in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 537–47 (1985). As Justice Brennan predicted in dissent, the de-
cision would “astound” and dismay constitutional scholars. Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
862 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Sotirios A. Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery:
New Meaning for the Tenth Amendment, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 164 (“Without a doubt the
decision will be roundly condemned by constitutional scholars.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Unravel-
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post–New Deal Court had carefully refrained from giving judicial
teeth to the idea that the national government was one of enumerated
powers.
In recent years, the Rehnquist Court has signaled its seriousness
about federalism. It has acted on the issue not once, but repeatedly,
over nearly a decade.3 Moreover, the Court has not limited its focus
to a single doctrine or aspect of federalism, but rather has opened
multiple fronts to be prosecuted simultaneously.4 Perhaps most nota-
bly, the Court has even been willing to return to service an old war-
horse from pre–New Deal campaigns: the Commerce Clause.5 The
Court’s concern with federalism has contributed significantly to a his-
torically unprecedented spate of federal legislation being struck down
as unconstitutional. In sharp contrast to most of its predecessors, the
Rehnquist Court has trained nearly as much of its activist fire on its
ing National League of Cities, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1066 (1977) (“I make no claims about
what the Justices [in National League of Cities] intended or ‘really had in mind.’ I haven’t a clue
what that might have been . . . .”).
3. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S. Ct. 955, 962 (2001)
(holding that suits against states under the Americans with Disabilities Act are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment); Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 166–74 (2001) (interpreting the Clean Water Act in light of federalism concerns); Morrison,
529 U.S. at 607–19 (holding that Congress lacked the authority under the Commerce Clause to
provide civil remedies for gender-motivated violence in the Violence Against Women Act);
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82–83 (holding that suits against states under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act are barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Alden, 527 U.S. at 741–54 (holding that
suits against states under Article I legislation are barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Coll.
Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (holding
that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act was not a valid abrogation of state sovereign im-
munity); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the federal government
may not commandeer state officials); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534–36 (1997)
(holding that portions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded congressional
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 72–73 (1996) (holding that suits against states under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566–68 (1995)
(holding that Congress lacked the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate gun pos-
session in school zones under the Gun-Free School Zones Act); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 174–77 (1992) (holding that a section of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act was invalid because it either violated the Tenth Amendment or went beyond
the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463–64 (1991)
(holding that the application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to state judges vio-
lated the Tenth Amendment).
4. In the past decade, the Court has expanded the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment as limits on federal authority, barred the “commandeering” of state government
officials by the federal government, and narrowed congressional authority under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 3.
5. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607–19 (holding that there is no congressional authority over
local, noneconomic, criminal activity); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552–67 (same).
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fellow coordinate branches of the federal government as on the rela-
tively powerless states and localities.
The Court’s actions raise any number of problems and puzzles.
Not least among those puzzles is the matter of explaining why the
Court has taken this course. Of course, it is possible to develop a
purely jurisprudential explanation that would conclude that the Court
has taken these actions simply because the Constitution, properly in-
terpreted, compelled it to do so when faced with the type of legisla-
tion at issue in these cases. Without question, the jurisprudential ex-
planation would be complicated and controversial.6 The text of the
Constitution has not changed in regard to federalism during this pe-
riod, and the statutes that the Court has examined generally have not
been especially innovative. What has changed is not the Constitution
or the laws, but the Court’s understanding of the Constitution. If the
Court has reached the correct judicial answers to these constitutional
questions only recently, then it remains to be explained why this
Court is willing or able to get these cases right when previous Courts
were not. A jurisprudential explanation of the Court’s recent federal-
ism offensive will have to be supplemented with a political explana-
tion. Although the political investigation need not be hostile to the
jurisprudential one, this Essay will limit itself to the former.
The federalism offensive can best be understood as a product of
the Court’s taking advantage of a relatively favorable political envi-
ronment to advance a constitutional agenda of particular concern to
some individuals within the Court’s conservative majority. The Court
has moved carefully but steadily to reestablish some federalism-based
constraints on the national government. The exercise of the power of
judicial review striking down acts of Congress, and on federalism
grounds no less,7 immediately evokes images of the Lochner-era8
6. For jurisprudential critiques of the Court’s federalism offensive, see, for example,
Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1011, 1038–63 (2000) (discussing the role of state dignity and sovereignty in re-
cent federalism cases); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforce-
able Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 850–51 (1999) (tracing the Supreme Court’s search for
an enforceable principle of federalism from the New Deal to Lopez and concluding that “lines
drawn in Lopez, New York, and Printz are unsupported by constitutional text, structure or his-
tory”); Herman Schwartz, The Supreme Court’s Federalism: Fig Leaf for Conservatives, 574
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 119, 123–29 (2001) (questioning the motives behind the
recent surge of federalism cases defending states’ rights).
7. See supra note 3.
8. “Lochner-era” refers to the first decades following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (invalidating a New York labor law as violative of
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Court’s pitched battles with the Roosevelt administration over the
New Deal and the Court’s ultimate humiliation.9 The analogy is mis-
placed, however. This Court is not in the same position or pursuing
the same strategy as the Lochner-era Court, and it is much more
likely that the Court will be able to maintain its current efforts with-
out significant political costs. In considering the Court’s federalism of-
fensive, Part I of this Essay lays out two approaches within the politi-
cal science literature for explaining Supreme Court decisionmaking.
Part II considers Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments
as an explanation for the recent transformations of the federalism ju-
risprudence. Part III builds on the new institutionalist school of
analysis to help explain the recent federalism revival.
I.  POLITICAL APPROACHES TO JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
There is a substantial political science literature on judicial deci-
sionmaking.10 This literature is concerned primarily with offering po-
litical (that is to say, nonjurisprudential) explanations for the deci-
sions that the judiciary, and especially the Supreme Court, makes.
This literature can be extremely useful, but it has to be approached
with some caution. For one thing, political scientists are not always
interested in explaining the same things as legal scholars. Not only are
they likely to focus on a different set of explanations in which doc-
trine and legal arguments play a limited role, but also they are likely
an employee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom of contract).
9. After more than three decades of resistance to progressive legislation at the state and
local level, the Court struck down central components of the New Deal on a variety of grounds,
including federalism. In 1937, President Franklin Roosevelt proposed a judicial reform measure
that would have expanded the size of the Supreme Court and allowed him to appoint a majority
of its members. In the same year, the Court abruptly reversed course and gave its approval to
new economic regulatory measures at the state and national level. For accounts of this period,
see generally BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998) (reevaluating the
“switch-in-time” story as part of the history of ideas, rather than as a political encounter,
thereby presenting an alternative reason for the change and using that reason to analyze the fa-
mous New Deal cases); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED (1993) (describing
the origins of and reaction to the Lochner era in terms of police power jurisprudence); WILLIAM
E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN (1995) (outlining three key pre-1937
cases, the Court-packing plan, and the resulting emergence of the “Second Bill of Rights”
through the incorporation doctrine).
10. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997) (as-
sessing the state of current analysis of judicial behavior and calling for more diverse research);
FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT (2000) (proposing an
interactive model of Supreme Court decisionmaking in which Justices use various signals to in-
fluence their colleagues’ decisions); TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL
COURT 80–132 (1999) (summarizing political science judicial decisionmaking literature).
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to focus on different objects of explanation. The outcomes of par-
ticular cases or the substantive content of particular opinions are
likely to fall outside the scope of political science analysis, which is
more concerned with general patterns. From a legal perspective, po-
litical science explanations of court behavior simply may not be very
satisfying. For another thing, political scientists are not of one mind as
to how best to understand the actions of the Supreme Court. Particu-
larly in the 1960s, fierce debates raged between political scientists
who primarily thought of the Court and the law in legal and norma-
tive theoretical terms and those who primarily thought of the Court in
political and positivist terms.11 For a long period thereafter, the latter
group was ascendant. Their primary product was what has become
known as the “attitudinal model,” which explains judicial outcomes in
terms of the policy preferences of individual Justices.12 Recently, an
alternative approach known as “new institutionalism” has become
prominent.13 There are several variations of the new institutionalist
approach, but they collectively emphasize the importance of the par-
ticular institutional environment of the Justices in affecting the
Court’s work.14 The approach may be particularly useful to help ex-
plain the Court’s recent actions.
To some degree, essentially all political science approaches to ju-
dicial decisionmaking are “externalist,” not “internalist,” as Professor
Christopher H. Schroeder defines those categories, in that political
science approaches incorporate explanations that “are not based on
11. Compare Wallace Mendelson, The Neo-Behavioral Approach to the Judicial Process: A
Critique, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 593, 602–03 (1963) (criticizing the neo-behavioralist theory of
judicial decisionmaking), with S. Sidney Ulmer, An Analysis of Behavior Patterns on the United
States Supreme Court, 22 J. POL. 629, 652 (1960) (using behavioral explanations for judicial deci-
sionmaking).
12. For the most comprehensive, recent defense of the attitudinal model, see JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 356–63
(1993) (responding to several criticisms of the attitudinal model). For a recent critique of the
attitudinal model, see Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 265–312 (1997).
13. For an introduction to new institutionalism as applied to the judiciary, see generally
SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (ana-
lyzing the Supreme Court as an institution, the internal decisionmaking processes of the Court,
and extrajudicial influences on Supreme Court decisionmaking).
14. The rational choice variant of new institutionalism is particularly concerned with stra-
tegic behavior by political actors in response to constraints and the use of political institutions to
solve collective action and information problems. The historical variant of new institutionalism
examines how institutions both regulate and constitute political preferences. Keith E. Whitting-
ton, Once More unto the Breach: PostBehavioralist Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 601, 608–16 (2000).
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anything “internal to the legal process itself.”15 Rather than being
strictly dichotomous, internalist and externalist explanations exist on
a spectrum of possible accounts of judicial decisionmaking. Attitudi-
nal explanations would likely fall near the extreme externalist end of
such a spectrum, since they minimize the importance of legal reason-
ing or doctrine in determining judicial outcomes.16 Other political sci-
ence approaches to understanding judicial behavior, most notably the
new institutionalist approaches, take internal features of the legal
process more seriously. These approaches do not embrace the pure
internalism of the legal idealist model, however. They instead offer
the type of middle-ground argument that Professor Schroeder be-
lieves may be most useful for understanding and explaining legal
change.
The attitudinal model views legal and constitutional change as a
simple matter of counting votes on the Court.17 In any given case, the
attitudinal model expects Justices to act so as to advance their pre-
ferred policies, regardless of such legal factors as precedent, statutory
or constitutional text, or historical intent.18 Judges behave like any
other political actors faced with making choices that have political
and policy consequences.19 They act so as to advance their precon-
ceived goals and reach the results that are most agreeable with their
personal predispositions.20 The very institutional features designed to
secure judicial independence (such as lack of electoral accountability)
insure that the Justices can give their ideological preferences “free
play”21 and “base their decisions solely upon personal policy prefer-
ences.”22 Although directly testing judicial adherence to the legal pro-
15. Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation,
51 DUKE L.J. 307, 327 (2001); see also CUSHMAN, supra note 9, at 4 (distinguishing the “inter-
nalist” and “externalist” explanations of the New Deal Court).
16. It might be noted that the attitudinalists use similar internalist-externalist terminology
to nearly opposite effect. For attitudinalists, “internal” relates to the individual rather than to
the law; thus, personal policy preference is an “internal” factor of judicial decisionmaking. By
contrast, precedent or threat of political reprisals would both be “external” factors that might
constrain the behavioral expression of the internal preference of the judge.
17. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 12, at 64–73, 241–55.
18. Id. at 64–65.
19. Id. at 72–73.
20. Id. at 214–55.
21. DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 72
(1976).
22. Id. Those institutional features that support purely attitudinal behavior are strongest at
the level of the Supreme Court. By contrast, lower federal judges may be constrained (to follow
precedent, for example) by the prospect of higher court review and reversal. See, e.g., Charles
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cess is difficult, supporters of the attitudinal model have noted that
Justices tend to vote in an ideologically consistent fashion over time
regardless of the particular facts or legal issues raised in individual
cases, and that simply knowing the past voting behavior of the Jus-
tices or even their ideological profile at the time of their nomination
is sufficient to predict accurately their votes in future cases.23 Justices
adhere to precedents only when they otherwise agree with them.
When individual Justices disagree with a precedent, they ignore it.24
When a majority of the Justices disagree with a precedent, they aban-
don it.25 Constitutional law changes whenever five Justices who would
prefer a different law land on the Court.
Strictly speaking, the attitudinal model no longer attempts to ex-
plain the origins of these policy preferences or the composition of the
Court.26 Nonetheless, this account of decisionmaking on the Court is
fully consistent with political science arguments emphasizing that ju-
dicial appointments follow the election returns. It should be empha-
sized that the attitudinal model implies that the Court as a whole only
follows the election returns through the process of judicial replace-
ment.27 Individual Justices will ignore electoral shifts and continue to
vote their personal policy preferences, even if those policies have
been rejected at the polls.28 Presidents and senators can be expected
to select Justices who are sympathetic to their own ideological predis-
positions. As a consequence, the course of constitutional law can be
M. Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Su-
preme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 102–08 (2000) (proposing that
appellate review acts as a mechanism for “enforcing doctrine” in a judicial bureaucracy); Frank
B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistle-
blowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2158–61 (1998) (suggesting that
circuit court dissents act as signals for Supreme Court review).
23. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 12, at 214–55, 363.
24. See HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL
287–88 (1999) (arguing that Justices are rarely influenced by stare decisis).
25. See Christopher P. Banks, The Supreme Court and Precedent: An Analysis of Natural
Courts and Reversal Trends, 75 JUDICATURE 262, 265–68 (1992) (pointing to an increase in
overturned precedent when ideological majorities are established).
26. In early versions, judicial “attitudes” were rooted in sociological and psychological
theories. See, e.g., GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND 22–43 (1965) (building on the
theoretical work of social psychologists). Those efforts were not terribly successful in explaining
the origins of judicial attitudes, and consistent with trends in economic theory, judicial prefer-
ences are now taken as a given.
27. For a classic statement of this thesis, see generally Robert A. Dahl, Decisionmaking in
a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
28. Id. at 284–86.
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expected over time to reflect electoral outcomes.29 Once this conclu-
sion is reached, the political science analysis of the judiciary fades into
the extensive literature on political parties and elections.
This literature can be extremely useful in clarifying aspects of the
Court’s behavior, especially in relation to the actions of the Justices
over a large number of cases. Some of the political scientists’ claims
still are being contested on empirical grounds, while other empirical
findings are still being interpreted.30 In the meantime, this type of
analysis tells us only so much. In keeping with the central tendencies
of empirical political science since the 1950s, the attitudinal model is
concerned with observable, measurable, and politically effective indi-
vidual behavior.31 As a purely externalist model of judicial decision-
making, the attitudinal model has little to say about the subjective ex-
perience of judging or the substantive content of legal reasoning and
judicial opinions. Although the externalist and internalist perspectives
are often posited as offering competing explanations of judicial be-
havior, the real challenge is to bridge the gap between them to de-
velop accounts that can reconcile the verifiable observations of the
externalist explanations with the also significant empirical support for
the internalist explanations. In part, this means understanding how
the legal process internalizes the “external” stuff of politics.
New institutionalist accounts of judicial behavior are focused
particularly on that issue, and Professor Schroeder’s helpful analysis
can be understood as a contribution to this growing literature.32 In
particular, his historicist account of the social and intellectual context
within which judicial doctrine is formulated is fully consistent with
what has become known as historical or interpretive new institution-
alism. In general, the new institutionalist approaches to politics
29. For an overview of this literature, see PERETTI, supra note 10, at 80–132.
30. See, e.g., Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test
the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 468–76 (2001)
(discussing the behavioralists’ limited analysis of legal variables in judicial decisionmaking); Jef-
frey A. Segal, Supreme Court Deference to Congress: An Examination of the Marksist Model, in
SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING, supra note 13, at 237, 240–53 (responding to game theory
critiques of the attitudinal model).
31. DAVID M. RICCI, THE TRAGEDY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 133–75 (1984) (discussing the
behavioralist revolution in political science); RAYMOND SEIDELMAN & EDWARD J. HARPHAM,
DISENCHANTED REALISTS: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE AMERICAN CRISIS, 1884–1984, at
149–86 (1985) (same).
32. See Schroeder, supra note 15, at 324–25 (suggesting that explanations for judicial deci-
sionmaking must account for political and social changes); see also Kathleen Thelen, Historical
Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 369, 372–99 (1999) (presenting
an overview of historical new institutionalism literature).
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broadly and to judicial politics specifically are concerned with investi-
gating how the context within which political actors make decisions
matters.33 The “institutional” environment, which encompasses pro-
cedural rules, other powerful actors, informal norms, intellectual dis-
courses, and other features, may structure, constrain, or guide politi-
cal decisions.34 For new institutionalism, the law matters to judicial
behavior, even as the law itself is embedded within a larger social,
political, and intellectual context.35 For rational choice new institu-
tionalists (or the “positive theory of institutions”), the law primarily
matters because of the sanctions that can come from violating it or
the collective action benefits that it can facilitate.36 Judges may have
political preferences, but they are constrained in their ability to pur-
sue those preferences, and legal materials may be among those con-
straints. For historical new institutionalists, the law also may matter in
socializing judges and creating new normative commitments (or pref-
erences) that they will seek to realize. For attitudinalists, preferences
are sincerely expressed. For rational choice new institutionalists,
preferences often may be frustrated by external constraints.37 For his-
torical new institutionalists, preferences often may be constituted by
contextual forces.38 Judicial understandings of the Constitution grow
33. See Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes: Institutional
Approaches to Supreme Court Decisionmaking, in SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING, supra
note 13, at 1–7 (criticizing the attitudinal theory of Supreme Court decisionmaking); Forrest
Maltzman et al., Strategy and Judicial Choice: New Institutionalist Approaches to Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, in SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING, supra note 13, at 46–57 (discussing
neoinstitutionalist theories of Supreme Court decisionmaking and external constraints on judi-
cial action).
34. See Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the “New Institutionalism,” and the Future
of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 92–99 (1988) (elaborating the incorporation of the
institutional environment into political science).
35. See Whittington, supra note 14, at 619–26.
36. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 12–18, 115–25, 145–57
(1998).
37. Id. at 12–17; Maltzman et al., supra note 33, at 48–57. Rational choice new institution-
alist accounts are still externalist in Professor Schroeder’s sense of the term, but less so than atti-
tudinal accounts. They explain judicial outcomes in terms of policy preferences and strategic
action relative to institutional constraints. Legal reasoning is purely instrumental (as a signal of
constraint or as a means for circumventing constraints) rather than intrinsically valued or moti-
vating in its own right. Id. at 52–57.
38. See Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive
Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, in SUPREME COURT
DECISIONMAKING, supra note 13, at 78–86 (discussing how the role of a Justice’s “mission” as a
Justice contributes to decisionmaking); Rogers M. Smith, If Politics Matters: Implications for a
“New Institutionalism,” 6 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1, 30–36 (1992) (proposing that political scien-
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out of a particular social, political, and intellectual environment. Al-
though attitudinalist research can be very useful in identifying the
preferences of judges, it generally is not very illuminating as to why
those preferences developed or under what conditions they may be
expressed and successfully realized in outcomes.39
II.  NO POTTED PLANT: JUDICIAL AGENCY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Identifying and explaining constitutional change is no easy task.
There is a deep jurisprudential and normative resistance to recogniz-
ing constitutional “change” outside the formal amendment process,
and once constitutional change is detached from formal constitutional
amendment then it becomes an empirical challenge to recognize the
timing, form, and substance of such change.40 One notable approach
to understanding constitutional change is Bruce Ackerman’s theory
of constitutional moments, in which judges articulating constitutional
law faithfully follow the constitutional transformations rendered in
the external political arena.41 Although Ackerman’s theory is ex-
tremely useful and stimulating, the recent federalism offensive sug-
gests the limits of his theory as a comprehensive approach to constitu-
tional change.
Assessing and applying Ackerman’s theory is complicated by the
fact that it is both positive and normative in its structure and aspira-
tions. Ackerman not only wants to construct a positive theory that
can account for constitutional change in American history, he also
wants a normative theory that can justify and delimit those changes
and guide the exercise of judicial review. Ackerman’s interpretation
of American constitutional history largely accomplishes both objec-
tives at once, but more recent history, and in particular the possibility
tists should study the various institutions that empower, constrain, and define the way political
actors function).
39. For a discussion of these approaches, see Whittington, supra note 14, at 617–32 (dis-
cussing theories of Supreme Court decisionmaking).
40. For a discussion of this resistance, see Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the
United States Constitution Been Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting for
Constitutional Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 14–24 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995)
(discussing the distinction between interpretation and amendment).
41. See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
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of “transformative appointments” to the Court,42 calls attention to the
tensions between these two strands of the theory.43 For present pur-
poses, we can lay aside the normative dimension of Ackerman’s the-
ory and simply consider how well it works as a positive theory of con-
stitutional change.
As Professor Schroeder notes, it is hard to argue that the recent
string of federalism cases is simply an evolutionary extension of ear-
lier precedents.44 Although in some instances the Court has been care-
ful to emphasize some continuity with prior doctrine,45 there is little
question that the Court’s assertiveness on federalism over the past
decade is quite distinct from its deference during earlier decades and
that the hurdles that the Court is now throwing up against congres-
sional action were not recognized as even existing ten years ago. Re-
gardless of whether we characterize this as a change in the Constitu-
tion itself, it is at least true that there has been a significant
discontinuity in the judicial interpretation and effective law of an im-
portant aspect of the Constitution. It is precisely such discontinuities
in constitutional law that Ackerman’s theory of constitutional change
seeks to address. Substantively, we seem to have passed into a new
“constitutional regime.”46
At the same time, we seem to have, at best, imperfectly experi-
enced the procedural requirements of constitutional change that
Ackerman’s theory envisions.47 Most importantly, Ackerman posits
42. Ackerman labels appointments to the Supreme Court that are intended to revolution-
ize constitutional law as “transformative.” Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1168–73 (1988).
43. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 389–416. These tensions are examined further in Keith
E. Whittington, From Democratic Dualism to Political Realism: Transforming the Constitution,
10 CONST. POL. ECON. 405, 411–12 (1999) (discussing the tension between Ackerman’s norma-
tive and positive theories).
44. Schroeder, supra note 15, at 317–22.
45. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 745–48 (1999) (relying on “settled doctrine”);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553–59 (1995) (determining that the ruling was “consistent
with the great weight of our case law”).
46. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 59. This is not to say that the posited constitutional re-
gime is particularly significant, far-ranging, or enduring, in historical terms. The notion of a “re-
gime” seems to imply all three, and Ackerman’s own narrative focuses on constitutional changes
of that sort, but that may simply indicate the limits of his particular approach.
47. Ackerman identifies four phases of “higher lawmaking”: a signal of broad and deep
popular support for constitutional reform, the articulation of an operational proposal, mobilized
popular deliberation on and approval of the proposal, and legal codification of the proposal. 1
ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 266–69; see also id. at 15–26 (using the four steps to explain the
Reconstruction and the New Deal); Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez
and Constitutional Theory, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 845, 847 (1996) (“[W]e cannot be in a con-
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that the Court is not the active agent of constitutional change.48 The
Court follows, and eventually codifies, the constitutional changes ini-
tiated elsewhere. Within Ackerman’s constitutional moment, political
actors signal their discontent with the Constitution as it is understood
and enforced by the Court and mobilize popular support on behalf of
a proposal to alter the inherited Constitution.49 Encountering a consti-
tutional impasse, political actors sharpen their point of contention
with the obstructionist institution and seek greater authority from the
people.50 Receiving an electoral mandate, newly empowered actors
then challenge the dissenting institution until the latter switches and
the new position is consolidated through subsequent elections.51 Al-
though in recent elections some political actors have talked about
constitutional issues,52 including federalism,53 it is difficult to identify
any broad and deep popular (or even elite) deliberation on specific
constitutional proposals or any decisive electoral acceptance of those
proposals. The 2000 presidential election even may have helped con-
tinue, if not exactly consolidate, the Court’s slim federalism major-
ity,54 yet even to the extent that the campaigns touched on the Su-
preme Court they did not focus on federalism. The Court seems to be
leading the constitutional charge relating to federalism, rather than
stitutional moment in Ackerman’s terms.”). More generally, however, Tushnet offers an ac-
counting of Lopez that is sympathetic to Ackerman. Tushnet, supra, at 875 (“Ackerman’s the-
ory sheds light on recent constitutional developments even if it does not fully explain them.”).
48. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 60–61.
49. Id. at 266–67.
50. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 18–20, 24.
51. Id. at 20.
52. See, e.g., Ann McFeatters, Party Rallies Faithful, Liberal Rhetoric is Theme of Day for
Democrats, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 16, 2000, at A1 (reporting the stance on abor-
tion rights and civil rights taken by Democratic leaders at the 2000 Democratic Convention);
Gaylord Shaw, No School Prayer, High Court Says Prayer Led by Student Unconstitutional,
NEWSDAY, June 20, 2000, at A5 (reporting statements made by Al Gore and George W. Bush
on school prayer during the 2000 presidential campaign).
53. See, e.g., Norman Ornstein, New Federalism Not Without Faults, USA TODAY, Sept. 23,
1996, at 15A (reporting policy positions on federalism taken by Bob Dole and Bill Clinton in the
1996 campaign); Robynn Tysver, Bush Talks Civility at Chicago Gathering, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, June 19, 2000, at 4 (reporting comments made by George W. Bush on the importance
of states). But see Donald F. Kettl, Which One is Your Pal?, GOVERNING, Aug. 2000, at 12
(stating that George W. Bush and Al Gore give “few real clues” of their stand on federalism
issues).
54. If given the opportunity, President George W. Bush is likely to appoint another Justice
favorably disposed to the federalism offensive. Given the ages of the current Justices, it seems
unlikely that Bush will be able to expand the size of the current majority and thereby make it
less vulnerable to future Democratic appointments.
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following a prior clear and authoritative expression of the popular
will on the subject.
As an explanation for these constitutional changes, the Acker-
man model seems inadequate. As Professor Schroeder notes, Acker-
man’s positive model of constitutional change must be incomplete:
“[i]f revolutionary constitutional change has occurred, and if that
change is legitimate, . . . . [t]here must be a causal process at work that
is materially different from the one Ackerman posits.”55 At the same
time, however, Ackerman’s rich historical narrative indicates that his
model is useful for explaining at least some constitutional changes in
the past. It is worth pausing to consider, therefore, why the model
does not seem to work in this case.
Ackerman’s model of constitutional moments ushering in new
constitutional regimes is closely linked to political science theories of
“critical elections,” with the similar notion of extraordinary elections
initiating significant political change and new political regimes.56 At
one level, this connection is clearly an advantage. “Realignment,” or
critical election, theory is a major contender in studies of American
political development, and Ackerman has opened a very fruitful in-
terdisciplinary dialogue by looking to such theories and grounding
constitutional theory within positive models of American politics and
history. At another level, the theoretical convergence creates difficul-
ties, as it exposes Ackerman’s theory to many of the criticisms leveled
at realignment theory while also raising concerns about the points at
which Ackerman diverges from traditional theories of critical elec-
tions.
A few problematic elements, in particular, of Ackerman’s reli-
ance on critical election theory can be highlighted. First and most ob-
viously, Ackerman emphasizes the importance of electoral shifts to
provoking and realizing constitutional change.57 The “We the People”
project is distinguished by the centrality, on both the positive and
normative dimensions, of electoral mandates provided by an active
and deliberate citizenry.58 These mandates provide elected officials
with the political capital and authority that they need to act on their
constitutional proposals, overcome political resistance, and institute
55. Schroeder, supra note 15, at 322.
56. Ackerman acknowledges his debt to critical election theory in 1 ACKERMAN, supra
note 41, at 329 n.1.
57. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 186–88, 281–90, 306–12.
58. Id. at 12, 18–20, 67–68.
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constitutional change.59 Closely following critical election theory,
Ackerman posits that these massive electoral shifts are what over-
come the conservative effects of the constitutional separation of pow-
ers and unify the government under a single banner.60 Absent a mobi-
lized electorate, proposals for constitutional change are redirected
into the institutional and political diffusion of normal politics.61
A second and related feature of Ackerman’s approach is its em-
phasis on big revolutions, or transformations.62 Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, Ackerman has devoted most of his attention to some of the
biggest political and constitutional upheavals in American history.63
The later constitutional moments identified by Ackerman64 are com-
parable to the Founding, in both the unconventional nature and the
substantive significance of the constitutional changes they wrought.
These later moments may be limited revolutions—they transform
rather than abandon the inherited constitutional order—but they are
revolutions nonetheless. They remake the very foundations of the
constitutional order (justifying the division of American history into
distinct constitutional regimes), require decades of effort to fully re-
alize and synthesize their effects, and appeal to the deepest aspira-
tions and concerns of the American people.
The model of constitutional moments also emphasizes relatively
sudden conflicts and shifts.65 The task of synthesizing and interpreting
the constitutional changes may take decades, but the effort of making
higher law is over within one or two election cycles.66 Although the
tensions in the existing constitutional regime and the movement ad-
vocating reform may take years to develop, the transformation of
mass opinion and dominant political alignments is sudden. In par-
59. Id. at 18–25.
60. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 47–51; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 21, 24–25. On
this dynamic, see WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRING OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 175–85 (1970) (discussing the role of critical elections as the driving force
of political change in American history). Notably, theories of critical elections have emphasized
political parties as the instrument of electoral responsiveness, government consolidation, and
policymaking.
61. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 269–72.
62. Id. at 58–80; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, passim.
63. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 44–67.
64. Ackerman focuses on the Reconstruction amendments and the New Deal as being
comparable to the Founding in their constitutional effects. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 17–
27.
65. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 266–94.
66. Id. at 285–90.
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ticular, Ackerman highlights the role of one institution in creating an
impasse to reform that must be overcome through extraordinary
means.67 Resistance to reform is natural in normal politics, but the
climactic institutional impasse is crucial to sharpening the constitu-
tional reforms being proposed and mobilizing popular support behind
them.68 The “switch in time” of the resistant institution in the face of
the overwhelming forces of reform effectively ratifies the constitu-
tional change and marks the beginning of the consolidation of the
new order. The climactic moments of the ratification of the Philadel-
phia Constitution, the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson
and unorthodox ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment following
the congressional elections of 1866, and the Court-packing plan and
judicial reversal following the elections of 1936 are exemplars of the
mechanisms of constitutional transformation.
There is a substantial amount of constitutional pushing and
shoving, and innovation, that goes on outside the context of such elec-
torally driven transformations.69 Critical elections are not the only
mechanism of political change, and constitutional moments of popu-
lar mobilization are not the only mechanism of constitutional
change.70 One complication of critical election theory comes from at-
tempting to extend the lessons of these historical political events to
67. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 18–24.
68. Id. at 280–88.
69. See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 216–18
(1999) (describing constitutional change outside of the electoral context).
70. Ackerman himself suggests one example in the decline of the Treaty Clause as the sole
procedure for entering international accords. Although Ackerman identifies 1944 as a “trigger-
ing election” on this issue, he provides no evidence that there was popular mobilization around
this issue or broad and deep deliberation on this issue within the general public. BRUCE
ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOVE, IS NAFTA CONSTITUTIONAL? 73–96 (1995) (“[W]e do not
wish to present the 1944 election as if it were a European-style referendum on this key issue.”).
The election simply kept the Democrats, who favored altering the procedures on international
agreements, in power long enough for them to oversee the postwar reconstruction of the inter-
national order. In numerous cases, the Supreme Court has altered inherited understandings of
the Constitution without prior popular mobilization initiating and authorizing such a change.
The Court’s conclusion that the Constitution prohibited racial segregation by the states and es-
pecially by the federal government radically changed the effective constitutional law and pre-
dated popular mobilization on this issue. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)
(holding that “separate but equal” in the context of racial segregation is inherently unequal);
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that the rule in Brown applies to the federal
government and the District of Columbia as well as the states). Similarly, the Court’s creation of
a new set of constitutional requirements governing police interrogations in the states did not
reflect any popular deliberation on the issue. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966)
(requiring police to advise arrestees of the right to remain silent).
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the present. Within political science and history, a fierce debate has
raged over the continued utility of theories of critical elections.71
Some scholars doubt how well the model can explain past events and
how coherent the model itself really is.72
Of greater concern for the immediate question is that many are
skeptical as to whether such electoral theories are applicable to con-
temporary politics. There is little question that at least by the late
1960s the United States had entered a historically unusual period,
which many have labeled a period of dealignment.73 In this period of
persistent divided government, political parties seem less capable of
organizing a coherent electoral coalition and overcoming the natural
barriers of the American constitutional structure.74 Relatedly, parties
seem less capable of mobilizing the broad electorate and winning loy-
alty from supporters. Rather than realigning in favor of a single
dominant party, voters and interests have dealigned from any party.75
The New Deal coalition has broken down, but the long-awaited new
majority has yet to emerge to take its place.76 In such a political con-
text, elections may mean less and be less important than once was the
71. For an introduction to the debate, see generally THE END OF REALIGNMENT? (Byron
Shafer ed., 1991) (discussing the value of the realignment theory).
72. See, e.g., Everett Carll Ladd, Like Waiting for Godot: The Uselessness of “Realignment”
for Understanding Change in Contemporary American Politics, in THE END OF REALIGNMENT?, supra
note 71, at 24 (claiming that the realignment model has detracted attention from other important politi-
cal changes); Joel H. Silbey, Beyond Realignment and Realignment Theory: American Political Eras,
1789–1989, in THE END OF REALIGNMENT?, supra note 71, at 3, 17–18 (arguing that the lessening im-
portance of political parties makes a future realignment unlikely).
73. See Edward G. Carmines et al., Unrealized Partisanship: A Theory of Dealignment, 49 J. POL.
376, 376 (1987) (attributing the dealignment that began in the 1960s to “unrealized partisanship”—the
failure of the maturing generation to socialize into the existing party alignment). “Dealignment” refers
to the defection of some constituencies from the political parties, which is normally regarded as a tran-
sitional stage leading to a “realignment” as those constituencies join new parties. In the modern period,
however, the apparent dealignment has been fairly enduring as voters remain “independent” rather than
simply switching party allegiances.
74. See Lloyd N. Cutler, Some Reflections About Divided Government, 18 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 485, 486–490 (1988) (analyzing party decomposition as a cause of gridlock); Lloyd N.
Cutler, To Form a Government, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 126, 136 (1980) (analyzing structural reasons
for a political “stalemate”).
75. MORRIS FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 10–14, 60–85 (1992); MARTIN P.
WATTENBERG, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES, 1952–1994, at 132–67 (1996).
76. Compare KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY 461–474 (1969)
(forecasting Republican realignment), with BYRON E. SHAFER & WILLIAM J.M. CLAGGETT,
THE TWO MAJORITIES 168–92 (1995) (describing the possibility of a split electorate), and Paul
Starr, An Emerging Democratic Majority, in THE NEW MAJORITY 224–31 (Stanley B. Green-
berg & Theda Skocpol eds., 1997) (forecasting the opportunity for a progressive realignment).
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case.77 Under such circumstances, we should not expect to see another
critical election.
If this account of contemporary politics is true, then two different
implications for constitutional change might follow.78 In keeping with
Ackerman’s model, it is possible that history has stopped. The col-
lapse of the partisan preconditions for transformative elections may
simply mean that constitutional changes will not occur. The conserva-
tive constitutional structure will continue to frustrate reformers until
such a time that they can once again mobilize the mass electorate.
Ackerman generally has not emphasized the partisan dimensions of
his historical narrative of American constitutional development and
thus has obscured both the mechanisms that have historically made
such changes possible and the potentially pessimistic ending to his
generally optimistic story of dualist democracy. His somewhat brief
and ad hoc argument about the failure of the Reagan revolution as a
constitutional moment79 may conceal a deeper truth about the mod-
ern political system, that conventional constitutional moments can no
longer occur.
A second possible implication is more likely—that the theory is
incomplete, and that constitutional change will continue to occur by
other means. The Court’s federalism offensive suggests that this must
be the case. An emphasis on critical elections as a solution to the em-
pirical and normative puzzles of constitutional change may hide al-
ternative paths that constitutional reform has taken or may take. Such
changes arguably may not be as fundamental, as enduring, or as le-
gitimate as the types of revolutionary transformations achieved
through constitutional moments, but they may be real and important
nonetheless.
Constitutional changes may have popular support, and yet be
neither initiated nor ratified by any critical election. Changes in
popular opinion and political inclination may occur gradually over
time rather than in a single climactic moment. Change may occur on
77. BENJAMIN GINSBERG & MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS 1–15, 37–75
(1990).
78. It should be noted that not all aspects of this account are universally accepted as true.
Notably, Walter Dean Burnham, the leading proponent of realignment theory, has argued that
“the right-wing revolution was not so much defeated [in the 1980s] as postponed” until the con-
gressional election of 1994 and, perhaps, the presidential election of 2000. Walter Dean Burn-
ham, Constitutional Moments and Punctuated Equilibria: A Political Scientist Confronts Bruce
Ackerman’s We the People, 108 YALE L.J. 2237, 2273 (1999).
79. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 390–400.
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an issue-by-issue basis without resulting in a general realignment of
the political parties, which are capable of accommodating movement
on a wide variety of issues, thereby limiting the partisan and policy
consequences of such shifts. Racial issues seemed to have followed
this pattern. Prior to the 1960s, race did not map neatly along partisan
or ideological divisions. The firm inclusion of the southern Democrats
in the New Deal coalition prevented the Democratic Party from
adopting a single coherent position on race, which likewise discour-
aged the Republican Party from making race a central issue. Lyndon
Johnson’s embrace of racial civil rights, countered by Barry Goldwa-
ter’s embrace of racial conservatism, began a process of polarization
that required years to develop fully. Over time, racial liberalism was
integrated into political liberalism and the Democratic Party, as racial
conservatism was integrated into political conservatism and the Re-
publican Party. Such cases suggest that “gradual transformations in
the party system are probably more typical [than abrupt transforma-
tions], occur more frequently, and account for the largest proportion
of political change.”80
Ackerman’s model also may be incomplete in that it does not ac-
count for situations in which no institution or actor can create an im-
passe that would necessitate extraordinary action by reformers, or, to
the extent that such obstructions and struggles occur, they must take
place outside of the institutional context of the national government.
Government officials may respond to events that they witness in the
social sphere without waiting for the electoral and institutional strug-
gle for reform to develop. Constitutional change may emerge from a
number of decisions, but not be itself an object of conscious choice.81
Such political dynamics may avoid the kind of self-conscious constitu-
tional deliberation and mobilization that Ackerman observes in his
cases. Effective constitutional meaning may change through general
agreement, incremental adjustment, and bargaining, circumventing
the revolutionary conflict-and-resolution that characterized the 1860s
and 1930s. Ackerman’s impasses and unconventional amendment ef-
forts may be particularly avoidable when the issues involved are lim-
ited, less intense, and less politically salient, and thus unlikely to pro-
80. EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION 157 (1989); see also
KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS 109–14 (1997) (describing how new is-
sues are incorporated into the existing partisan structure).
81. See Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing Structural
Foundations of Federalism, 25 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 483, 486–88 (1998) (describing twentieth cen-
tury changes in federalism as a result of the interaction of several political trends).
WHITTINGTON.DOC 12/21/01 2:41 PM
2001] THE COURT’S FEDERALISM OFFENSIVE 495
voke any significant political actor into becoming as intransigent as
President Johnson or the Lochner-era Court. Most constitutional is-
sues may be of interest only to a few and may not be of sufficient sali-
ence to support a broad-based political movement.82 Such impasses
also may be less likely to develop when the substantive dispute in-
volves the reduction, rather than the expansion, of government
power, thus minimizing the likelihood of judicial review.83 Although
the Court’s recent federalism decisions evoke memories of the
Lochner-era Court, the Rehnquist Court thus far has avoided creating
the kind of institutional impasse the early-twentieth-century Court
created.
Constitutional change may result from the actions of political
elites without any substantial participation by the masses. In Acker-
man’s own case studies, constitutional innovation largely is initiated
by elites (though perhaps drawing on reform movements with deeper
roots).84 High-level government officials are driven to appeal to the
people broadly only when faced with the obstruction of other gov-
ernment officials who cannot be overcome by other means.85 It is the
strength of the resistance to the constitutional change that forces re-
formers to mobilize the people on their own behalf. Popular mobiliza-
tion is a tactical decision within a political struggle over constitutional
forms, and such decisions are necessarily contingent on the inade-
quacy of other means to overcome the obstructionist officials.
The Supreme Court particularly may be unlikely to seek popular
participation in pushing forward constitutional change. It is instruc-
tive that elected officials—not appointed judges—turned to the peo-
ple for reinforcement in Ackerman’s cases of Reconstruction and the
New Deal.86 It is perhaps unsurprising that elected officials would
seek support from their own electorates and vaunt their mandates
when faced with political opposition. By contrast, the Supreme Court
82. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19–26
(1934); Charlotte Twight, Constitutional Renegotiation: Impediments to Consensual Revision, 3
CONST. POL. ECON. 89, 91–101 (1992).
83. See Mark A. Graber, The Jacksonian Origins of Chase Court Activism, 25 J. SUP. CT.
HIST. 17, 27 (2000) (“Fundamental questions of constitutional power could not be litigated be-
fore the Supreme Court as long as the party of more narrow constitutional construction was vic-
torious in the elected branches of government.”); Kent Greenawalt, Dualism and Its Status, 104
ETHICS 480, 497 (1994) (“No constitutional law change was critical to accomplishment of
Reagan’s major objectives . . . .”).
84. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 160–85, 312–44.
85. Id. at 186–88, 306–11.
86. Id. at 18–20, 23–25.
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is institutionally ill equipped to appeal over the heads of elected rep-
resentatives to the people themselves. If the Court were to initiate
constitutional change, it would be unlikely to win support through a
critical election. Popular acquiescence to its decisions is about all the
Court can expect to attain. But acquiescence may be enough to effec-
tuate change. Ackerman has not yet provided a detailed accounting
of the rise of either the Lochner-era Court or the Warren Court,
though he places both in the role of interpreting and preserving the
unconventional constitutional amendments put in place a generation
earlier.87 It could be argued plausibly, however, that both Courts were
activist in the sense of being constitutional innovators.88 As such,
these Courts may have led, rather than followed, other government
officials and the electorate toward important constitutional changes.
In doing so, both Courts may have encountered resistance and pro-
voked public argument about their actions, but neither Court sought
or won popular ratification of their actions in the sense that Acker-
man envisions. The majority on each of those Courts took advantage
of the political environment to advance a distinct constitutional
agenda. The Rehnquist Court is doing the same.
III.  THE REHNQUIST COURT’S VELVET REVOLUTION
If there has been a revolution in the constitutional law of feder-
alism over the past decade, it has not been the kind of tumultuous
revolution described by Bruce Ackerman. The Rehnquist Court has
not stormed the barricades of the centralized state while rallying the
masses to its devolutionary banner. At the same time, the federalism
offensive is without question a political event. Laying aside the mo-
tives of the majority of the Justices on the Court, the Court’s actions
are rife with political consequences and concerns. A revolution in the
law requires more than an intellectual awakening.89 It requires con-
certed effort, careful strategy, and good luck. Ackerman and the new
institutionalists have alerted scholars to the political obstacles to con-
87. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 131–59.
88. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 485–501
(2000) (discussing the areas of constitutional law that the Warren Court addressed and placing
the Court in its contemporary political context); Burnham, supra note 78, at 2267–70 (noting
that the Lochner-era Court and the Warren Court built on prior constitutional changes by ex-
panding constitutional law far beyond what was anticipated when the original change was
made).
89. See ROBERT JUSTIN LIPKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS 118–53 (2000) (treating
constitutional revolutions as a matter of judicial deliberation).
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stitutional change and the difficulty with which reformers negotiate
them.90 The Court has deduced that the social and political context is
conducive to constitutional reform on federalism, the Justices are
willing to exploit those opportunities, and the Court has been politi-
cally astute in advancing its agenda without triggering serious opposi-
tion.
The Court’s recent actions were hardly inevitable. Undoubtedly,
these federalism decisions seem particularly precarious, given that
they generally depended on exceedingly thin one-vote majorities, and
that the future of those decisions easily could have been affected by
the national elections of 2000. A Democratic presidential victory
would have made the majority, and probably those recent precedents,
exceedingly vulnerable to changes of personnel on the Court. None-
theless, the fragility of the Court’s federalism majority should not ob-
scure the fact that the decisions also grew out of a particular social
and political context that made them more likely and more sustain-
able. This larger context created political openings the Court chose to
exploit, and it provided the intellectual foundations to motivate and
legitimate the actions the Court has taken.
By the end of the twentieth century, the time was ripe for a re-
vival of judicial interest in the constitutional restrictions on national
power imposed by the federal structure. Serious judicial interest in
federalism was nearly inconceivable in the decades after the Court’s
1937 retreat from the battle over the New Deal, in which the Court’s
federalism jurisprudence suffered increasing strain leading up to an
eventual retreat.91 The social and political conditions favoring cen-
tralization had begun to erode by 1976, when the Court tested the wa-
ters of federalism again,92 and they were in full decline by the early
1990s, when the Court began its current, more sustained questioning
of the post–New Deal federalism jurisprudence.93
Those changing conditions need only be outlined here. Social
and economic changes, and the political interpretation of those
90. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 254–94; WHITTINGTON, supra note 69, at 214–23.
91. On judicial developments during this period, see CUSHMAN, supra note 9, at 141–225
(describing the events leading to the New Deal crisis).
92. See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845–52 (1976) (holding that Congress
lacks the authority to interfere in traditional state governmental functions).
93. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159–66 (1992) (holding that Congress
may not commandeer state legislative processes); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457–64
(1991) (holding that state authority over state government officials is essential to the federal
structure).
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changes, in the early and middle twentieth century drove the centrali-
zation of government power. It was not until the very end of the nine-
teenth century that the United States developed a truly national
economy and began to develop a national culture. Intimately con-
nected to those economic and social transformations was the rise of
an administrative ethos of management and control of social forces.94
The new corporate managers had no use for destabilizing economic
competition or inefficient subnational political diversity. The same
mindset infused government during the Progressive Era and encour-
aged a turn to centralized, bureaucratic expertise in formulating and
implementing government policy. The economic and social disloca-
tions caused by the developing corporate economy also encouraged
positive state action to address them.95 Centralization was recognized
to be complementary to the successful use of the regulatory and redis-
tributive functions of government, especially in this new economic
context. The states proved incapable of successfully addressing the
political demands of the early twentieth century. Worse, the states
were perceived as part of the problem for many of the moral reform
movements of the twentieth century, including most notably the racial
civil rights movement.96 Neither the conceptual tools nor the norma-
tive pieties of the Court’s federalism doctrine traveled well in this
new environment. Federalism could be seen as an outmoded or even
tragic element of the American constitutional scheme and appropri-
ately subject to political reconsideration and adjustment.
In recent decades, these economic and social conditions have
changed. The administrative ethos and its promise of policymaking
free of politics and better living through rational planning are met
with increasing skepticism and a greater appreciation for decentral-
ized decisionmaking.97 The centralized positive state that was thought
necessary to deal with the Great Depression and the Second World
War holds fewer charms, given the new array of political concerns
94. See Whittington, supra note 81, at 490–93 (discussing the administrative ethic and the
progressive movement).
95. See id. at 493–500 (discussing the centralization of government power during the first
half of the twentieth century).
96. See id. at 500–03 (discussing the public morality of the Progressive Era). Notably, the
national government itself encouraged the view that federalism was responsible for civil rights
concerns at mid-century. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS 148, 182–83, 215,
229–30, 241 (2000) (discussing the diplomatic strategy of blaming federalism for racial injustice).
97. See Whittington, supra note 81, at 515–16 (describing the declining faith in administra-
tive ethos).
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and the decades of experience with the policy successes and failures
of the national government.98 Although the night watchman state99—
concerned only with keeping the peace—is not about to become the
new political ideal, the national government has fewer comparative
advantages in addressing contemporary political issues, and centrali-
zation is less essential to national goals.100 National politicians can be
expected to continue trying to win electoral favor by responding to
popular dissatisfactions, but their contributions on salient issues
ranging from education to crime control, from environmentalism to
economic development, are more evidently marginal and supplemen-
tary than they were to the central political issues of earlier periods.
The states also have benefited from earlier reform efforts and an al-
tered public consciousness.101 The states are more professional, more
capable, and less venal than they once were.102 They are also less evi-
dently out-of-step with mainstream national values, and those values
are themselves less certain and single-minded than during such re-
formist periods as the 1960s.103 Such foundational changes have mani-
98. See id. at 503–15 (hypothesizing about a shift toward a more decentralized state after
the 1960s).
99. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26 (1974) (“[T]he night-watchman
state of classical liberal theory [is] limited to the functions of protecting all its citizens against
violence, theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement of contracts, and so on . . . .”).
100. The primary comparative advantage of the national government is in regulatory and
redistributive policy areas, where affected actors might otherwise flee political jurisdictions to
escape government-imposed costs. The increased capacity of people and businesses to escape
across even international borders and the declining importance of these policy areas on the
American political agenda reduces the comparative advantage of the national government vis-à-
vis the states and localities as a policy provider. Of course, the national government also has
primary responsibility for national defense, and the centralization of political power tends to
accompany wartime mobilization. The more enduring and comprehensive the mobilization, the
greater the centralization is likely to be, and it is likely to cross a wider range of policy areas. It
remains uncertain how extensive the national government’s domestic mobilization behind the
new “war on terrorism” will be, but it seems unlikely that it will have significant consequences
for the Court’s activities in such areas as the Commerce Clause, state sovereign immunity, or
the scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
101. See Whittington, supra note 81, at 520–22 (suggesting that the states have benefited
from, and changed due to, both internal and external forces).
102. See DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM 249–83 (1995) (embracing the
concept of a resurgent role for the states); Mavis Mann Reeves, The States as Polities: Reformed,
Reinvigorated, Resourceful, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 83, 84 (1990) (noting
that “[t]he role and condition of the states are crucial in any assessment of intergovernmental
relations”). See generally ANN O’M. BOWMAN & RICHARD C. KEARNEY, THE RESURGENCE
OF THE STATES 1–104, 187–256 (1986) (enumerating several reasons for state revitalization, in-
cluding reform in both the executive branch and in state governments).
103. See Whittington, supra note 81, at 516–22 (emphasizing the notion that a resurgence of
state power “requires the moral recovery of the states”).
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fested themselves in, among other things, a striking deterioration in
the citizenry’s support for and trust in the national government rela-
tive to state and local governments.104
It is possible that the Justices have considered such features of
modern American life and have developed a policy preference for
devolution. They may act directly on that policy preference105 or con-
vince themselves by a process such as that described by Professor
Schroeder that their preferences are consistent with constitutional re-
quirements.106 The economic circumstances of the 1930s put immedi-
ate intellectual and practical pressure on inherited ideas and doctrines
about federalism. There was no similar tension between circumstance
and doctrine in the 1990s. It would not be implausible to imagine that
if the Constitution was “besieged” by the circumstances of the early
twentieth century, and New Deal Justices took steps to accommodate
those circumstances,107 then the circumstances of the late twentieth
century simply created a space to reevaluate that accommodation.
The old, exiled Constitution, as understood by traditional legal rea-
soning, simply could be reasserting itself in the judicial mind now that
the siege has ended. Given the divergent reactions of many to these
changing conditions (many still trust the national government), the
divergent legal implications of such a transformation (those who fa-
vor policies of decentralization need not, as a legal matter, favor con-
stitutionally enforced decentralization), and the fragmented constitu-
tional discourse (was the old Constitution “exiled,” “amended,” or
“corrected” in the 1930s?), it is not surprising that only some judges
would join the federalism offensive. At the same time, a larger social
environment that at least renders problematic the normative and em-
pirical assumptions of the New Deal jurisprudence could be expected
to produce at least a few judges who would come to doubt the consti-
tutional fidelity of that jurisprudence.
104. See Schroeder, supra note 15, at 352–56 (describing a judicial decisionmaking model
based on the theory of motivated reasoning).
105. It might be noted that this account of twentieth-century tendencies does not have a
very specific attitudinal implication. It could support a general principle of decentralization or
more specific preferences about which policies should be decentralized and which should not.
106. I believe the attitudinalists would have no difficulty embracing Professor Schroeder’s
description of the judicial cognitive process. See Schroeder, supra note 15, at 352–56 (modeling
judicial decisionmaking processes on the cognitive theory of motivated reasoning). The external
model would work just the same with or without the psychological account.
107. See GILLMAN, supra note 9, at 147–93 (characterizing the post-Lochner era as a battle
between a progressive social movement and its conservative opponents).
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The changed circumstances of the late twentieth century are im-
portant for the Court in at least two ways. First, it creates the political
opportunity for the Court to pare back the centralizing excesses of
the post–New Deal constitutional law. Professor Schroeder argues
that from the perspective of the individual citizen or elected official
“the perceived costs of not reposing trust in the federal government
has been declining, making it easier to allocate authority to state and
local governments.”108 This dynamic also makes pro-decentralization
judicial decisions less costly to other political officials. Pro-
decentralization judicial decisions are less painful to other political
actors in the 1990s than they were in the 1930s, and, as a consequence,
important political actors can be expected to be more tolerant of such
decisions and less willing to expend political capital to challenge
them. The Court’s effective range of politically acceptable action on
federalism has widened as the drive for centralization on the part of
other powerful political actors has lessened. The odds of encountering
an institutional impasse to the Court’s new federalism offensive has
been reduced, and, thus, it is now easier and safer for the Court to
take this course than it would have been even two or three decades
ago.
Second, the intellectual context of the Rehnquist Court era helps
legitimate the Court’s federalism offensive. All political actors need
some principled rationale beyond their personal preferences in order
to effectively exercise political power.109 The Court may feel this need
particularly strongly. As Alexander Hamilton famously observed, the
judiciary has the advantage of neither the sword nor the popular will,
relying only on the persuasiveness of its judgment.110 Moreover, the
forms of legitimation available to the Court are particular.111 Al-
though contemporary theory and politics can support a wide range of
conflicting constitutional interpretations, there remain limits on what
the Court plausibly can claim that the Constitution means before it
raises substantial questions about its actions. For example, despite the
hard work of numerous revisionist scholars, the Supreme Court’s
108. Schroeder, supra note 15, at 342.
109. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS 1–64 (1981) (listing the preservation of their perceived
neutrality as a central problem that courts face).
110. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
111. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1–42 (1991) (outlining six
modalities of constitutional debate that help maintain the legitimacy of judicial review).
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Lochner v. New York112 opinion continues to ring false to modern
ears. As Oliver Wendell Holmes charged in his dissent at the time,
the Court’s arguments in Lochner tend to strain credulity and invite
concerns that the Justices merely were legislating their policy prefer-
ences.113 A modern Court could not easily attempt to revive that rea-
soning and doctrine.
Dual federalism is not as notorious as substantive due process,
but as long as the view was common that “if in the United States one
disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism,” the
Court could hardly place the protection of federalism at the center of
its jurisprudence, and would be unlikely to want to do so.114 The re-
versal of fortunes of the national and state governments in terms of
public trust during the last three decades of the twentieth century115
created a friendlier normative environment for the Court’s revival of
interest in federalism. Striking down congressional statutes in favor of
state and local authority became more acceptable when Congress was
perceived as “the public enemy.”116 More directly, the Rehnquist
Court has benefited from the efforts of the conservative legal intellec-
tual movement to build scholarly respectability for a more restrictive
federalism jurisprudence.117 The Supreme Court itself helped revive
112. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For an overview of the revisionist history of Lochner, see generally
Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 221 (1999).
113. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
114. WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM 155 (1964).
115. See Schroeder, supra note 15, at 346–51 (observing that public perceptions of elected
officials, among other factors, contributed to the severe decline in public trust in the federal
government); see also Pew Research Center, Deconstructing Distrust: How Americans View
Government, tbls.1, 2, at http://www.people-press.org/trusttab.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2001)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal) (tracking the decline in trust in the federal government);
NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll of December 7, 2000, Roper Center, at http://web.
lexis-nexis.com/universe (last visited Aug. 23, 2001) (accession number 0376554) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (finding that only 25 percent of those polled have the “most trust” in
federal government, compared to 29 and 36 percent for state and local governments).
116. See JOHN HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC ENEMY 31–
36, 158–62 (1995) (describing the lack of public support for Congress as an institution).
117. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 77–176 (1987)
(probing the original intent regarding federalism); Charles J. Cooper, The Demise of Federalism,
20 URB. LAW. 239, 245–80 (1988) (observing the decline of federalism as a constitutional princi-
ple); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387,
1443–54 (1987) (insisting that “the expansive construction of the [commerce] clause accepted by
the New Deal Supreme Court is wrong”); Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value:
National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 97–109 (emphasizing the im-
portance of National League of Cities in recalling basic “constitutional principles”); see also
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 186–88 (1991) (discussing concerns for federalism in the
Reagan administration); Jonathan Mahler, The Federalist Capers, 8 LINGUA FRANCA 38, 39–41
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interest in the subject with its 1976 National League of Cities v. Usery
opinion.118 Some commentators have suggested that the opinion pri-
marily was intended to be educative rather than regulative, simply in-
tended to remind the nation of federalism principles without signaling
any sustained effort to enforce them.119 Although this interpretation
probably gives greater intellectual coherence to the Court’s actions
than is warranted, it may well be true that the opinion served such a
function. Consistent with conservative political attacks on the “big
government” in Washington and the rise of originalist theories of
constitutional interpretation, some legal academics and lawyers began
to reconsider the doctrinal burial of federalism.120 In doing so, they
helped lend legitimacy to the Court’s later actions.
Ultimately, a willing Court must exploit such opportunities if
they are to be realized in constitutional law. The Rehnquist Court has
proved willing. The federalism offensive has required a steady stream
of appropriate cases, at least five fairly united Justices, and at least
one judicial entrepreneur interested in pressing this particular consti-
tutional agenda. The ready availability of appropriate cases is an ob-
vious prerequisite for significant judicial alteration of constitutional
law, but one that cannot be assumed.121 The judiciary is a reactive in-
stitution that must wait for disputes and issues to be brought to it
(though judges can signal their willingness to hear certain kinds of
cases).122 Constitutional litigation is a difficult and expensive process,
however, and especially when an issue is not very socially or politi-
cally salient, the appropriate cases may not work their way up the ju-
dicial hierarchy to the Court. The federalism offensive has benefited
from the participation of state governments, which are powerful po-
tential litigants with an interest in this issue, as well as a number of
(1998) (describing the rise of the Federalist Society). See generally Symposium on Federalism, 6
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (1982) (examining the importance of federalism in the eyes of con-
servative scholars and policymakers).
118. 426 U.S. 833, 840–52 (1976).
119. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 190–95 (1982); ROBERT F. NAGEL,
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 79–82 (1989).
120. See supra note 117.
121. See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 11–70 (1998) (examining the impor-
tance of a litigation “support structure” to a judicial “rights revolution”); see also MARK V.
TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950,
at 70–166 (1987) (detailing the litigation campaign to overturn racial segregation in public edu-
cation).
122. Such judicial signals are sometimes fairly explicit, as when the Justices offer suggestions
as to how they might rule in future cases. At other times, signals to potential litigants are im-
plicit in the recent pattern of decisions, both on certiorari and on the merits.
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conservative public interest groups who are willing to develop feder-
alism-based claims.123
The votes supporting the federalism offensive came through re-
placement rather than through conversion. New York v. United
States124 in 1992 may be taken as the beginning of the current federal-
ism revival.125 That case stands out from the subsequent federalism
cases in that all nine Justices joined at least part of the majority
opinion, whereas the subsequent cases have been decided by identical
5-4 votes.126 The renewed interest in federalism on the Court is clearly
part of the legacy of President Ronald Reagan. Of the five Justices in
the federalism majorities—Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas—three were Reagan ap-
pointees, and Reagan elevated the Chief Justice to his current posi-
tion. The remaining Justice, Justice Thomas, was appointed by
George Bush and clearly reflected Reagan-era legal conservatism.
Federalism was not a priority of the Nixon administration.127
Nixon always had an uneasy relationship with the “new right” and its
ideological concerns.128 Although Nixon’s administration did push a
federalism initiative, it was largely pragmatic and did not question the
basic role of the national government in the post–New Deal order.129
By contrast, Reagan’s interest in federalism was closely related to his
interest in limited government, and, as a consequence, it had greater
constitutional implications and broader ideological significance.130
123. See Paul Chen, The Supreme Court’s Federalism Jurisprudence and the Rise of the
New Right 2–5 (Mar. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (de-
scribing the rising importance of conservative public interest groups as a necessary institutional
shift to support the Supreme Court’s recent decisions).
124. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
125. But see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457–64 (1991) (limiting application of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act with regard to state judges, thereby upholding state-
mandated retirement for judges, one year before the decision in New York).
126. A large number of the Court’s recent federalism cases have been decided by an identi-
cal five-Justice majority comprised by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Ken-
nedy, Scalia, and Thomas. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001);
Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
127. MELVIN SMALL, THE PRESIDENCY OF RICHARD NIXON 194–95 (1999).
128. JOAN HOFF, NIXON RECONSIDERED 78–79 (1994); SMALL, supra note 127, at 153–55.
129. HOFF, supra note 128, at 65–73.
130. See Demetrios Caraley, Changing Conceptions of Federalism, 101 POL. SCI. Q. 289,
292–96, 304–06 (1986) (describing Reagan’s federalism initiatives as part of a broader conserva-
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These presidents’ differing visions affected their appointments to the
Court. Nixon’s goals in choosing Justices were as much political as
ideological, and even his ideological concern with selecting “strict
constructionists” for the Court was oriented toward the themes of his
“law and order” campaign.131 By contrast, Reagan’s appointment
strategy was tightly focused on jurisprudential considerations, consid-
erations including support for “deference to states in their spheres”
and “recognition that the federal government is one of enumerated
powers.”132 To the extent that federalism commitments lost out to
competing values and interests in the policymaking of the Reagan
administration, the appointment of judges supportive of federalism
was an important strategy for making conservative commitments to
decentralization credible and effective.133
The Court’s jurisprudence reflected these different presidential
concerns. Although more conservative than its predecessor on some
issues, most notably criminal justice, the Burger Court, with its four
Nixon appointees, was no more sympathetic to states and localities on
federalism issues than its predecessors.134 Then-Associate Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist was, of course, the exception to this pattern.
Rehnquist received minimal consideration before his nomination by
the Nixon administration, but the Reagan administration enthusiasti-
cally embraced him as the exemplar of a Reagan Justice,135 in part be-
cause of his National League of Cities opinion. On the Burger Court,
only the Reagan-appointed Justice O’Connor voted with Rehnquist
tive agenda); see also Richard P. Nathan, Review of The New Federalism, 104 POL. SCI. Q. 342,
342–43 (1989) (reviewing TIMOTHY CONLAN, NEW FEDERALISM, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
REFORM FROM NIXON TO REAGAN (1989)) (distinguishing the federalism initiatives of Nixon
and Reagan).
131. See DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES 97–125 (1999) (examining Nixon’s
nominations to the Supreme Court through the lens of his political and policy objectives). In
announcing his nomination of Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist to the Court, Nixon chose
to emphasize his desire to “strengthen the hand of the peace forces” against the “criminal
forces” as central to his “judicial philosophy.” Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation An-
nouncing Intention to Nominate Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist to Be Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States (Oct. 21, 1971), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON, 1971, at 1055 (1972).
132. YALOF, supra note 131, at 143–44.
133. For an assessment of Reagan-era policy choices, see Timothy J. Conlan, Federalism and
Competing Values in the Reagan Administration, 16 PUBLIUS 29, 44–46 (1986).
134. With only three Reagan appointments, the early Rehnquist Court was little different.
Richard C. Kearney & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Decision Making: The Impact of
Court Composition on State and Local Government Litigation, 54 J. POL. 1008, 1022–23 (1992).
135. DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT 6–19 (1992); YALOF, supra note 131, at 124, 149–
50, 153.
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more than 70 percent of the time on cases involving federalism is-
sues.136 The Nixon-appointed and conservative Chief Justice Burger
was no more likely to agree with Rehnquist on these issues than was
the arch-liberal Justice Brennan.137 Federalism was the one issue area
in which Burger did not walk in near lockstep with Rehnquist.138
Reagan and Bush appointed not just conservative Justices, but Jus-
tices who were much more conservative on federalism than their
predecessors. A comparison of sitting Justices with their predecessors
reveals a dramatic increase in their agreement with Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Only Justice Souter was effectively the same as his prede-
cessor on constitutional federalism cases.
AGREEMENT WITH REHNQUIST ON FEDERALISM ISSUES
INVOLVING NATIONAL SUPREMACY139
Departing
Justice
Agreement
with
Rehnquist
Reagan/
Bush
Appointee
Agreement
with
Rehnquist Change
Stewart 55% (38) O’Connor 89% (96) +34
Burger 50% (58) Scalia 96% (77) +46
Powell 52% (61) Kennedy 93% (65) +41
Brennan 51% (83) Souter 50% (51) -1
Marshall 50% (82) Thomas 93% (50) +43
136. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 527–28 (1996).
137. Id. at 527. The Burger-Rehnquist agreement rate in federalism cases was 61.7 percent,
while the Brennan-Rehnquist rate for the same period was 60.3 percent. Id.
138. Id. at 527–28. Overall, Burger’s agreement with Rehnquist was 87 percent, exceeded
during the period only by O’Connor’s 88 percent. Id.
139. Harold J. Spaeth, United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953–2000 Terms, at
http://www.ssc.msu.edu/~pls/pljp/sctdata1.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2000) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal). Figures are the percentage of cases in which each of the Justices voted in favor of
the same party as Chief Justice Rehnquist. Figures in parentheses are the total number of cases
in which the Justice and Chief Justice Rehnquist both participated. The agreement scores of the
Justices were compiled using the cross-tabulate function of the SPSS statistical software, cross-
referencing the votes of each of the listed Justices with the votes of Chief Justice Rehnquist on
all cases with issues codes 930–49 (constitutional federalism cases involving national supremacy
and “miscellaneous federalism cases”). The table was compiled using voting information
through the completion of the Court’s 1999 Term.
WHITTINGTON.DOC 12/21/01 2:41 PM
2001] THE COURT’S FEDERALISM OFFENSIVE 507
It is particularly notable that on federalism, O’Connor and Ken-
nedy are fairly firmly within the conservative bloc.140 In many of the
Rehnquist Court’s constitutional cases, those two Justices have pro-
vided the constraining force against change.141 The more conservative
jurisprudential inclinations of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas are reined in by the moderating inclinations of
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, often joined by Justice Souter. By
contrast, the conservative wing of the Court is relatively united on
federalism, and therefore has been able to sustain a longer, broader,
and more substantial reconsideration of the constitutional relations
between the national government and the states than in other areas,
where the possibility of defection and the necessity of compromise
are greater. Justice O’Connor, for example, wrote the majority opin-
ions in New York v. United States142 and Gregory v. Ashcroft143 that
launched the federalism offensive. She signaled her willingness to go
even further than Chief Justice Rehnquist in restraining the national
government’s influence over the states in her dissent in South Dakota
v. Dole.144 Justice Kennedy still may be a limiting force on the major-
ity, however. Despite writing important majority opinions in City of
Boerne v. Flores145 and Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe,146 Kennedy
pointedly swung against the states in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton.147
This Court is also notable for having a number of Justices who
take a particular interest in federalism. Significant change is difficult
to accomplish within any institution. One of the difficulties in orches-
trating change is the sheer quantity of issues that most political actors
must face. The Justices, like other government officials, are presented
140. Jeffrey Rosen, A Majority of One, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001, § 6, at 32.
141. See Charles Lane, Laying Down the Law, Justices Ruled with Confidence, From Bush v.
Gore Onward, Activism Marked Past Term, WASH. POST, July 1, 2001, at A6 (noting that Jus-
tices Kennedy and O’Connor often are the swing votes for the conservative bloc).
142. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
143. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
144. 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (narrowly construing the permissi-
ble conditions that the federal government may impose on states in accepting grants-in-aid).
145. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
146. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
147. 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]here exists a federal right of
citizenship, a relationship between the people of the Nation and their National Government,
with which the States may not interfere.”); see also Earl M. Maltz, Justice Kennedy’s Vision of
Federalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 761, 764–67 (2000) (noting that Justice Kennedy may support na-
tionalist constitutional principles at the expense of state autonomy).
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with more issues than they possibly could address. Every issue comes
with opportunity costs, and the Justices must prioritize. The Justices
must make decisions about which issues to consider and which to lay
aside. Even a Court composed of Justices generally sympathetic to
federalism concerns may well choose not to pursue this opportunity in
order to focus its attention on other matters it regards as more press-
ing or important. Relatedly, in order to initiate significant change, the
Justices must have a vision that will be fruitful across a number of
cases and will not simply produce doctrinal dead ends. National
League of Cities is instructive in this regard, as Rehnquist was never
again able to marshal a majority to implement or extend his vision of
state sovereignty.148
Compared to its predecessors, the Rehnquist Court is particu-
larly interested in issues of constitutional structure. Federalism cases
have represented an increasing percentage of the Court’s work in re-
cent years.149 Federalism long has been a particular interest of the cur-
rent Chief Justice, who was educated in the western United States
and who began his career in Goldwater’s Arizona, and federalism has
formed a distinctive part of his jurisprudence.150 Also from Arizona,
but with a political background more deeply rooted in state govern-
ment, Justice O’Connor also has demonstrated a keen interest in fed-
eralism cases. Somewhat surprisingly, through a number of remark-
able concurring and dissenting opinions, Justice Thomas has
evidenced an interest in a radical rethinking of the Court’s federalism
jurisprudence.151 Justice Scalia’s jurisprudential inclinations toward
148. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 863–73 (3d ed. 2000)
(describing the Court’s difficulty in applying National League of Cities).
149. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 196–200 (7th ed. 2001) (describing shifts in
the Court’s agenda).
150. See generally SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 135–88 (1989)
(describing Rehnquist’s “important role” in reviving the federalism debate within the Burger
Court); Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J.
1317, 1320–46 (1982) (analyzing Rehnquist’s theory of federalism).
151. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (en-
couraging abandonment of the substantial effects test as inconsistent with the original intent of
the Framers); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (ob-
jecting to the extension of congressional authority over wholly intrastate commerce); Camps
Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 609 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence as “unmoored from any constitutional
text”); U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the origins of
the Constitution and the implications for reserved powers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that “our case law has drifted far from the
original understanding of the Commerce Clause” and should be reconsidered).
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formalism, positivism, and originalism most often have made them-
selves known in his separation of powers opinions, but they have
ready implications for federalism as well.152 The current Court not
only has the votes to advance the federalism offensive, but also has
influential individuals who regard federalism as an important priority
and who are willing to exploit opportunities to advance that cause.153
Although the Rehnquist Court’s federalism offensive is impor-
tant, its importance should not be overstated. The Court has moved
carefully to avoid antagonizing the interests of powerful actors who
potentially could threaten the Court’s legitimacy.154 This conclusion
may be surprising, given that this Court has been particularly aggres-
sive in striking down acts of Congress, even though Congress has far
more resources with which to strike back at the Court than do the
state governments that the Court more often has targeted in the
past.155 Moreover, the revival of federalism harkens back to the
Lochner-era Court and the political repercussions of its resistance to
the New Deal. In his dissents, Justice Souter has been particularly di-
rect in reminding the Court of the potential consequences of repeat-
ing the errors of the Lochner era.156
The current federalism revival is unlikely to lead to Lochner-like
consequences, however. The Lochner-era Court did a great many
things, and the modern charge that the court is “Lochnerizing” can be
similarly broad. For present purposes, however, the Lochner-era
Court did something quite specific. In restricting the powers of the
national government in the early 1930s, it rendered impossible the
central political goals of the newly empowered Democratic Party.
152. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 918–25 (providing a structural analysis of federalism).
153. The possible departure of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor from the
Court in the near future may put the federalism offensive in jeopardy. It seems unlikely that the
other three members of the federalism majority would be capable of replacing the leadership of
Rehnquist and O’Connor in this area.
154. Congress has made serious challenges to the Court in the past when the latter struck
down policies that were particularly important to the legislative majority or its primary constitu-
ents. See, e.g., infra note 155.
155. On Congress’s reaction to the Court in prior conflicts, see WALTER F. MURPHY,
CONGRESS AND THE COURT 127–241 (1962) (describing Congress’s reaction to the Cold War
security cases); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power,
54 REV. POL. 369, 378–83 (1992) (analyzing various instances of judicial retreat in the face of
legislative threats).
156. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (comparing sovereign
immunity cases to Lochner); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 166 (1996) (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (warning that the majority has forgotten the lesson of Lochner); United States v. Lo-
pez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (same).
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What is most striking about the Court’s struggle against Progressivism
and the New Deal is not how many laws were struck down or how
persuasive the Court’s jurisprudence might have been, but how politi-
cally salient the Court’s actions were. Not since the Dred Scott deci-
sion157 had the Court claimed that the central mission of an ascendant
political coalition was contrary to the basic precepts of the fundamen-
tal law of the nation. The Court forced the Democratic Party to un-
dermine the authority of the Court in order to legitimate itself.158
More prosaically, the Lochner-era Court effectively prevented Con-
gress and the Roosevelt administration from adopting policies that
they regarded as essential to the nation’s recovery from the Great
Depression and to their own political program. At the same time, the
Court’s actions were seen as both directly and indirectly blocking
similar progressive legislation at the state level, creating a “‘no-man’s
land’ where no Government—State or Federal—can function.”159 The
Court created an impasse that the other two branches were forced to
overcome in order to secure their own electoral survival and the sur-
vival of their policies.160
Although treading some of the same theoretical ground as the
Lochner-era Court, the Rehnquist Court has avoided creating any-
thing like the same political dynamic. The Court’s recent Commerce
Clause cases are illustrative. It is not yet clear how extensive the im-
plications of the Court’s revival of the Commerce Clause as a con-
straint on the national government will be, and that is a significant
distinction between the 1990s and the 1930s. In the 1930s, it very
quickly became evident that the Lochner-era Court was not going to
accept the First New Deal and that the options for circumventing the
Court’s constitutional objections were extremely limited. By contrast,
the Rehnquist Court has taken pains to minimize the possible impli-
cations of its actions. Rather than challenging the post–New Deal ju-
risprudence on the Commerce Clause, in the Court’s opinion in Lo-
pez Chief Justice Rehnquist extensively reviewed the doctrinal
history of the Commerce Clause and simply accepted the core doc-
157. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
158. For an elaboration of this point, see Keith E. Whittington, Presidential Challenges to
Judicial Supremacy and the Politics of Constitutional Meaning, 33 POLITY 365, 383–90 (2001).
159. 5 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 192 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938).
160. See generally 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 255–382 (describing various Court-
packing plans); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 9, at 82–162 (same).
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trine laid down by the New Deal Court.161 Although Lopez gave those
doctrines new bite, it is notable that the Court eschewed any claim to
doctrinal innovation in this area and implicitly reassured other actors
that the central commitments of the New Deal were not up for recon-
sideration. In particular, the Court did not question whether Congress
had authority over all obviously economic activities. The Court re-
opened the debate over the proper relationship between the state and
federal governments, but it did not seek to turn back the clock on the
central commitments that the national government has accepted in
the twentieth century.
In rejecting a law as beyond the enumerated powers of Congress,
the Court did not show the kind of deference to congressional
authority that had come to be expected of the post–New Deal Court.
In passing the law, Congress at least demonstrated that a majority of
its own members approved of the substantive goals of the legisla-
tion,162 and the representative character of Congress gave at least
plausibility to the assumption that popular majorities shared the leg-
islature’s views in this regard. Both laws were relatively new when
considered by the Court, and thus they were likely to be supported by
contemporary majorities. Neither the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990163 nor the Violence Against Women Act of 1994164 raised the kind
of fundamental liberty or democratic representation concerns that
have been regarded by some as particularly close to the Court’s mis-
sion.165 The Court seemed to take a substantively countermajoritarian
161. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555–59 (characterizing the decision as “consistent with the great
weight of our case law”).
162. Passage of the statute also suggests that a majority of Congress thought that the bill was
within their constitutional authority. Especially given the Court’s long deference on this front,
there is little reason to believe that legislators gave the constitutional issues, as opposed to the
substantive issues, much thought. It is at least possible, therefore, that Congress might not be
antagonistic to the Court’s closer constitutional scrutiny of these statutes. See also Mark A.
Graber, Naked Land Transfers and American Constitutional Development, 53 VAND. L. REV.
73, 76, 85–98 (2000) (observing that the “Supreme Court can impose limits on federal power
without ‘thwarting the will of the actual representatives of the people of the here and now’”).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (setting
forth the conditions that trigger heightened review); see also JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 60–128, 171–259 (1980) (arguing that the
protection of individual rights is the essential function of judicial review); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73–179 (1980) (developing a process-based theory of judicial re-
view).
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action in defense of purely formal values, which might be thought to
make the Court particularly vulnerable to a political backlash.
Congress passes a wide variety of laws, and not all of them are
equally important to legislators or manifest their benefits in the same
way. It can be expected that the political reaction to the Court will be
strongest when the costs of the Court’s actions to elected officials are
greatest. Legislators do not always derive political benefit from the
actual implementation of legislation.166 It may be particularly useful to
distinguish between a politician’s need for “credit claiming” and his
need for “position taking.” Credit claiming can be defined as
acting so as to generate a belief in a relevant political actor (or ac-
tors) that one is personally responsible for causing the government,
or some unit thereof, to do something that the actor (or actors) con-
siders desirable . . . . The emphasis here is on individual accom-
plishment . . . and on the congressman as a doer.167
Credit claiming is politically important, but it is not always applicable.
It works best when an individual legislator can credibly claim respon-
sibility for particularized benefits to constituents, such as constituent
casework and pork barrel appropriations.168 For more general legisla-
tion, it is often too difficult for constituents to know whom to credit
(or blame) for the legislation itself or for any results, and it is often
too difficult for politicians to be able to count on observable results
from legislation.169 For many issue areas, such as crime, it is almost
impossible to determine whether legislation had any effect at all, in
which case the politically salient goals are better defined in terms of
outputs (e.g., one hundred thousand new policemen on the streets)
than results (e.g., reduction in criminal activity).
Position taking, by contrast, does not depend on legislative re-
sults. It can be defined as “the public enunciation of a judgmental
statement on anything likely to be of interest to political actors. The
statement may take the form of a roll call vote.”170 Importantly, “[t]he
electoral requirement is not that [the congressman] make pleasing
166. See also Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court’s
Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 460 (2001) (observing that members of Congress
typically have little to gain from bringing forward constitutional objections to bills).
167. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 53 (1974).
168. Id. at 53–60.
169. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 44–51, 71–76
(1990) (describing informational difficulties in legislative politics).
170. MAYHEW, supra note 167, at 61.
WHITTINGTON.DOC 12/21/01 2:41 PM
2001] THE COURT’S FEDERALISM OFFENSIVE 513
things happen but that he make pleasing judgmental statements.”171
An individual legislator cannot take credit for a piece of general leg-
islation’s good effects, or even for its enactment, but he can always
take credit for voting the right way on the issue.172 Moreover, some
legislation is “politically compelling,” in that “legislators feel com-
pelled to support certain policy options because the intended effects
are popular, irrespective of whether the proposed means will really
achieve those ends.”173 Legislators may be obligated politically to sup-
port bills that announce goals such as ending violence against women
or creating gun-free schools, but the political benefit that they get for
expressing their support for such goals is probably all the political
benefit they ever will get from such legislation and perhaps all they
desire from it.174 Moreover, having supported such legislation in the
roll call, they are unlikely to receive any particular blame if the legis-
lation fails for any reason to achieve its goals.
The statutes that the Court reviewed in Lopez and Morrison are
clearly of the position-taking type. By the time the Court struck down
parts of these laws, legislators already had derived all the political
mileage they were going to get from them. Indeed, the Court’s actions
even provided an opportunity for legislators and other political actors
to score a few more political points by being seen denouncing the
Court for obstructing attempts to promote the safety of women and
children. Furthermore, the Court may have made it slightly more dif-
ficult for voters to assign blame to any particular elected official when
future episodes of guns in schools or violence against women occur.
There is relatively little for legislators to gain from voters, however,
by investing political resources in a substantive effort to curb the
Court in the aftermath of these cases. The political costs of judicial
review were far too small, and the potential political benefits of court
curbing are far too uncertain.
171. Id. at 62.
172. Legislators may gain political benefit specifically because of a bill’s failure to pass, as
when, for example, the president can be blamed for vetoing potentially popular legislation. See
JOHN B. GILMOUR, STRATEGIC DISAGREEMENT 119–31 (1995) (analyzing the passage and ef-
fect of “veto bait” legislation); Tim Groseclose & Nolan McCarty, The Politics of Blame: Bar-
gaining Before an Audience, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 100, 106–13 (2001) (analyzing legislative bar-
gaining strategies given an audience of voters).
173. ARNOLD, supra note 169, at 77–78.
174. It should be noted that not all position-taking opportunities are so clear-cut. The right
way to vote on a particular piece of legislation depends both on the particular constituency and
the framing of the issue (is this an anti-crime measure or a gun control measure?).
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These measures are also notable in that they do not represent the
central legislative goals of any particular political coalition. The New
Deal legislation was central to the Democratic Party’s political goals,
and the Democratic Party could be expected to take continuing inter-
est in such policies. The interpretations that the 1930s Court gave to
the structural features of the Constitution had direct and immediate
implications for those legislative goals. In repeatedly striking down
such legislation,175 the Court placed itself squarely against the interests
of the dominant political party of the period. Support for federalism
in the 1930s was, quite visibly, opposition to the New Deal. Unsur-
prisingly, Democratic officials reacted accordingly. Franklin Roose-
velt, for example, was explicit in labeling the courts as agents of the
“Republican Party.”176 The Rehnquist Court’s federalism cases do not
follow that pattern. In the present circumstances, the relationship be-
tween interpretations of the Constitution’s structural features and any
particular political agenda is highly contingent and uncertain. To the
extent that a constraining interpretation of federalism limits the pow-
ers of the national government, then political actors who hope to use
the national government to achieve their political objectives may re-
act negatively. But neither political party in the current period has
uniform interests in that regard, and the Court is unlikely to impose
broad restrictions on federal power. Moreover, the substantive inter-
ests at stake in these cases are neither highly salient nor closely identi-
fied with any particular political coalition or party. These laws were
the product of highly transitory, ad hoc majorities.177 Legislative ma-
175. See, e.g., Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513,
523–32 (1936) (striking down the Act of May 24, 1934, which provided for the emergency tem-
porary aid of insolvent public debtors, on the grounds that the Act violated state sovereignty);
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 286–317 (1936) (striking down the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 on the ground that the Act exceeded Congress’s authority under the
Commerce Clause); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 57–77 (1936) (determining that certain
provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act were an unconstitutional assertion of power by
Congress); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528–55 (1935) (hold-
ing that specific provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act exceeded Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 348–74
(1935) (holding that the Railroad Retirement Act fell outside the scope of Congress’s powers
granted by the Commerce Clause); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414–30 (1935) (in-
validating certain executive orders and regulations promulgated under the National Industrial
Recovery Act on the grounds that they exceeded constitutional limits on Congress’s delegation
of power).
176. 1 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 837 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938).
177. Legislative majorities in Congress are usually stable and party-based. Occasionally, for
example on distributional issues such as transportation bills, legislation arises out of an ad hoc
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jorities were mobilized to pass these statutes in the first instance, but
no organized majorities stand behind them. As a result, these cases do
not create or antagonize any distinctive opposition to the Court. As
stand-alone issues, they are not important enough to justify sustained
political resistance to the Court. At the same time, they are not part
of any integral political package. The Court’s recent federalism deci-
sions had no particular implication for any broad legislative agenda,
and thus no broader coalition was mobilized by the results in these
individual cases. In contrast to such issues as civil rights or abortion,
there is no coherent “federalism” lobby or interest. Politically, the
immediate losers in the Court’s federalism cases will remain isolated,
unless and until the cases have more foreseeable negative conse-
quences for a wider range of interests.
Mounting a serious campaign against the Court requires substan-
tial political resources and numerous committed allies who must see
their own interests as threatened by the Court. In striking down New
Deal legislation, the 1930s Court was confronting precisely that kind
of mobilized coalition. Even then, however, the Court was capable of
deflecting the administration’s Court-packing plan by defusing or-
ganized labor’s opposition to the Court with a favorable ruling in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.178 Conversely, the segrega-
tionists who were outraged by Brown v. Board of Education179 were
hapless until they could make common cause with anti-Communists
offended by the Court’s actions in 1957.180 The Warren Court was sub-
sequently more cautious in picking its opponents.181
The Court can expect to strike down laws such as those at stake
in Lopez and Morrison with few political consequences. Although
crime is an important bipartisan issue, it is too nebulous to support
mobilization against the Court over these two statutes. Moreover, as a
federalism issue, the public tends to regard crime as an issue better
coalition of legislators that organizes largely outside normal party channels and only for the
sake of the passage of that single bill.
178. 301 U.S. 1, 29–43 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act as a valid exer-
cise of Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause); see also Gregory A. Caldeira, Public
Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR’s Court-Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139,
1148 (1987) (tracking the collapse of public support for President Roosevelt’s Court-packing
plan).
179. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
180. See POWE, supra note 88, at 93–102 (describing the national security cases of 1957 and
the coalescing of opposition to the Court).
181. See id. at 127–43 (describing congressional reaction to certain Warren Court decisions
and the Court’s response).
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addressed at the local level, in keeping with the Justices’ own instincts
in these cases.182 As such, the Court is unlikely to be seen as seriously
hampering crime control with these decisions.
The recent case of Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers183 raised a more difficult problem for the Court,
and, consistent with this analysis, the Court advanced the federalism
offensive, but even more carefully. Solid Waste Agency involved the
regulatory interpretation of the Clean Water Act by the Army Corps
of Engineers, in particular the “migratory bird rule” that extends the
Corps’s authority to include intrastate waters that provide habitat for
migratory birds.184 Unlike crime, environmental protection is com-
monly regarded as an appropriate function of the national govern-
ment.185 As a regulatory function with continuing political support,
environmental protection shares the centralizing biases of the positive
state.186 The Corps’s understanding of federally regulated waters
tested the Rehnquist Court’s willingness to constrain the post–New
Deal state. The facts of the case raised the possibility that the Court
might extend its Lopez logic to further advance its federalism offen-
sive.187 Although the migratory bird rule is relatively minor and of
limited political visibility, any constitutional action in this case neces-
sarily would hold implications for the broader range of federal envi-
ronmental regulation, which carries substantial political importance.
Unlike most criminal issues, environmental issues have an array of
organized and stable interests behind them. Environmental legislation
182. Pew Research Center Poll of January 9, 1997, Roper Center, at http://web.lexis-nexis.
com/universe (last visited Aug. 23, 2001) (accession number 0270891) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (demonstrating that the public has more trust and confidence in state and local
governments to fight crime relative to the federal government by a two-to-one margin).
183. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
184. Id. at 162–66 (describing the genesis of the migratory bird rule under Section 404(a) of
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994)).
185. Post-Modernity Project at the University of Virginia Poll of January 27, 1996, Roper
Center, at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe (last visited Aug. 23, 2001) (accession number
0280232) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (reporting that members of the public regard the
protection of the natural environment to be mainly the responsibility of the national govern-
ment by a two-to-one margin).
186. See Whittington, supra note 81, at 493–500 (discussing how regulatory activities create a
centralizing bias).
187. The migratory bird rule extended federal jurisdiction beyond navigable waterways that
could be used for interstate commerce to isolated, intrastate bodies of water, potentially ab-
sorbing traditional state authority over land-use planning and without an adequate showing of a
substantial effect on interstate commerce of such regulated activities. Moreover, the activity
being regulated—the filling of such bodies of water—may, in many cases, be noncommercial in
nature.
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is a central feature of the liberal surge of the late 1960s and early
1970s, and it continues to attract substantial political support.188 Envi-
ronmentalism also tends to be largely a position-taking issue, but the
interest groups that attend to environmental issues force lawmakers
to engage in greater policy activity for their position taking to be
credible.189 In sum, striking at environmental regulation would give
greater policy significance to the Court’s federalism offensive, but it
also would heighten the political costs of these decisions to voters and
legislators and, therefore, possibly, to the Court.
Faced with these possibilities, the Court made a strategic com-
promise—rejecting the broad interpretation of the Act by the Corps,
while deferring the constitutional judgment of that broad interpreta-
tion.190 Rather than escalating the conflict to the constitutional level,
the Court shifted the burden back to Congress.191 The Court increased
the difficulty of achieving the policy favored by the Corps, since it
now must be reestablished by the positive and explicit action of (a
possibly Republican) Congress.192 If Congress is able to agree on leg-
islation reestablishing a similar rule, the Court will have another op-
portunity to consider the constitutional issue—but this time with a
better measure of the political costs of doing so. The Court has clearly
signaled its constitutional and policy concerns to the other branches
and to the lower courts while minimizing any political backlash, since
the responsibility for the final policy has been placed squarely in the
hands of the legislature. The Court has refrained from creating a con-
188. See MARC ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSITION 118–53 (1993) (de-
scribing the rise of “new social regulation”).
189. ARNOLD, supra note 169, at 64–68.
190. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172–74
(2001) (“We thus read the statute as written to avoid the significant constitutional and federal-
ism questions raised by respondents’ interpretation.”).
191. Id. at 172–73 (“Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer
limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”).
192. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had interpreted the Clean Water Act’s requirement
for federal landfill permits for projects involving “navigable waters” to include waters that
served as habitat for migratory birds. In regard to an abandoned gravel pit that neither was a
navigable water nor adjoined navigable waters, the Court held the Corps’s interpretation was
clearly grounded in neither the statutory text nor the legislative intent. Given an administrative
interpretation that “alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment
upon a traditional state power,” the Court required a clear “indication that Congress intended
that result.” Id. at 167–73; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 74–80 (1994) (analyzing statutory interpretation as an anticipated response
game); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 26, 30–42, 56–57 (1994) (analyzing law as a product of strategic interaction).
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stitutional impasse and thereby has diverted political opposition away
from itself, while still placing obstacles in the way of centralization.193
CONCLUSION
Over the past decade, the Court has revived federalism as an ac-
tive constraint on the power of the national government after a half-
century of near disuse. The possibility of the Court relying on the
Commerce Clause to strike down an act of Congress would have
seemed ridiculous in the immediate aftermath of the consolidation of
the New Deal constitutional order, and it would have seemed highly
unlikely even a decade ago. Before the recent federalism revival, it
generally was admitted—in a nod to the plain constitutional text—
that there were theoretical limits to the authority of the national gov-
ernment,194 but it was hard to imagine any of those limits being en-
countered in judicial practice. The Rehnquist Court now has claimed,
not just once but several times, across a range of cases, that Congress
in fact has exceeded those limits. Although it remains to be seen how
long and how far the Court can and will sustain this federalism offen-
sive, the campaign thus far has been quite significant.
But how should it be explained? Ultimately, it must be explained
in a fashion that takes account of both politics and law. A purely legal
explanation would have difficulty accounting for the timing and form
of the Court’s changing constitutional interpretation. A purely politi-
cal explanation would neglect the particular institutional features of
the Court and its deep concern for the law. The Court must make de-
cisions within a particular social and political environment; it is not
immune to the effects of that environment. That environment condi-
193. The Court’s sovereign immunity cases represent another avenue for reasserting feder-
alism values while minimizing political backlash. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S. Ct. 955, 962 (2001) (holding that suits against states under the
Americans with Disabilities Act are barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80–91 (2000) (determining that suits against states under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act are barred by the Eleventh Amendment). Within the context of
sovereign immunity, the Court can address more politically important legislation involving, for
example, age or disability discrimination precisely because the policy consequences of the
Court’s actions are relatively small (the larger set of claims against private employers are left in
place) and legislative responses remain available (through action by the state governments).
194. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968) (“This Court has always recognized
that the power to regulate commerce, though broad indeed, has limits.”); Santa Cruz Fruit
Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 466 (1938) (“The expansion of enterprise has vastly in-
creased the interests of interstate commerce but the constitutional differentiation still ob-
tains.”).
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tions how judges, as well as other political actors, think about politics
and the law. That environment also can limit what actions the Court
practically can take.
Consistent with recent conservative intellectual and legal
thought, a majority of the Justices on the current Court believe that
the constitutional constraints on the national government imposed by
the federal structure are more extensive than was commonly accepted
in the immediate postwar period. Whether fully consistent with the
original Constitution or not, there was a clear ideological and political
rationale for greater centralization of government authority in the
early twentieth century.195 That rationale is no longer central to con-
temporary American politics. To some degree, this makes the na-
tional government less relevant to American life than it once was. To
some degree, this means that some actions the national government
takes will be hard to justify in terms of the old rationales. To a skepti-
cal Court, excesses of centralization will not be hard to find. Moreo-
ver, as excesses, the political support for such policies can be thin.
Statutes that are struck down are no longer—as they were during the
New Deal—necessary measures to cure the ailments of the national
economy; they are more likely to be politically expedient responses to
the passions of the moment. These statutes respond to the sorts of
transitory pressures the Court is less likely to feel and integrate into
its constitutional decisionmaking.
The Lopez Court is not the Lochner Court. Substantively, the
Lopez Court is more developmental than reactionary, feeling its way
toward a distinctly post–New Deal decentralization of the federal sys-
tem. Politically, the Lopez Court is swimming with the political cur-
rent rather than against it, and the Court has given no indication of
wanting to challenge central commitments of dominant political ac-
tors. Nonetheless, the Lopez Court has been unusually active in
striking down acts of Congress and reorienting constitutional law. In
doing so, the Court has been an autonomous agent of constitutional
change. The Court has seized the political opportunities that have
presented themselves to advance the Court’s own understanding of
the Constitution. The Court has been opportunistic.196 It has not at-
195. See Whittington, supra note 81, at 490–503 (arguing that the interaction of political
movements and events in the early twentieth century favored centralization of the federal gov-
ernment).
196. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 192, at 43 (characterizing the current Court as
“risk-averse”); Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of
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tacked the still-vital center of the New Deal constitutional consensus,
but rather has taken advantage of a softening at the margins of the
New Deal regime. The Court is not alone in doing so. But along with
other political actors, the Rehnquist Court is participating in a politi-
cal process of constitutional change.
Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 63–76 (1999) (characterizing the current Court
as administratively and substantively downsized).
